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PRODUCT SIMULATION: THE DEATH KNELL FOR
THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY-THE
STIFFEL AND COMPC0 CASES
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' the respondent, Stiffel
Company, had developed a pole lamp which proved to be a commercial
success. Stiffel then secured design and mechanical patents upon the
vertical lamp. Soon after their introduction on the market, Sears, Roe-
buck & Company came out with a substantially identical lamp, which
sold for a lower price than Stiffel's lamp, Sears' retails price being
about the same as Stiffel's wholesale price. Stiffel then brought an ac-
tion against Sears in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, alleging that by copying its design Sears had in-
fringed Stiffel's patents and that Sears had engaged in unfair compe-
tition under Illinois law, since by selling copies of respondent's lamp
Sears had caused confusion in the trade as to the source of the lamps.
2
The district court first held that the patents granted Stiffel were
invalid for want of invention.3 The court went on to find that the Sears
lamp was a substantially identical copy of the Stiffel lamp, and that
their similarity in design was likely to cause confusion between them,
and that some confusion had already occurred. The court enjoined
Sears from selling or attempting to sell the pole lamps and ordered an
accounting to fix profits and damages resulting from the conduct of
Sears. The court of appeals affirmed,4 holding that under Illinois law
it was not necessary to show a "palming off" to prove unfair competi-
tion.5 Finding a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the lamps,
the court held Sears liable under Illinois law for doing no more than
copying and marketing an unpatentable article. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 6
At this point it should be kept in mind that though the consumers
might confuse the two products this does not suggest that consumers
associated either lamp with a particular source, a necessary finding
1376 U.S. 225 (1964).
2The evidence at the trial court consisted of a showing that consumers had
asked Stiffel whether its lamps differed from those of Sears and that in two
cases, customers who had bought Stiffel lamps had complained on learning
Sears was selling substantially identical lamps at a much lower price.
2 No review of this determination was sought in the Supreme Court, so the
lamp must be considered, for the purposes of this decision, uncopyrighted and
unpatented.
4 Stiffel Co. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 313 F. 2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
5It is highly questionable whether the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted
Illinois law in light of Stevens-Davis Co. v. 'Mather & Co., 230 Ill. App. 45
(1923), which specifiically held that "palming off" was an essential ingredient
in unfair competition.
6 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 374 U.S. 826 (1963).
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under the traditional theory, which would require a showing that Sears
was passing off its goods as those of Stiffel.
In the companion case of Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc.,7 the respondent, Day-Brite, a manufacturer of flourescent lighting
fixtures, had obtained a design patent on a reflector. Day-Brite also at-
tempted to gain a mechanical patent but their application was denied.
Short after Day-Brite introduced their fixture on the market, Comp-
co's predecessor" began manufacturing fixtures very similar to Day-
Brite's. Day-Brite then instituted an action against Compco, charging
that Compco had infringed their design patent and including an all-
egation which in effect claimed that Compco was "palming off" its
fixture to purchasers as that of Day-Brite's and that in doing so,
Compco had unfairly competed with Day-Brite.
The district court, as in the Stiffel case, held the design patent
invalid 9 and though the court did not find that Compco had engaged
in any deceptive or fraudulent practices, it did find that Compco had
engaged in unfair competition under Illinois law. The court, also as
in the Stiffel case, ordered an accounting and enjoined such further
conduct by Compco. The court of appeals affirmed, 10 holding there was
substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's finding
of likely confusion between the two products and that this finding was
sufficient to support the holding of unfair competition.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision of
the court of appeals in both the Stiffel and Compco cases. The Court
held that the Illinois unfair competition law, as interpreted by the court
of appeals, encroached upon the federal patent and copyright law. The
court noted that pursuant to article I, section 8, clause 8, of the Con-
stitution," Congress had enacted extensive federal statutes in the
patent and copyright area and that the federal policy behind these
statutes could not be set aside by state law. In emphasizing the con-
flict between the goals of the federal statutes and the Illinois unfair
competition law, Mr. Justice Black stated in Stiffel:
Thus the patent system is one in which uniform federal
standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the
same time preserving free competition. Obviously a State could
not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give
7376 U.S. 234 (1964).
8 The sales of which Day-Brite complained had actually been made by the
Mitchell Lighting Co., but at the time of the filing of the complaint Mitchell
had been acquired by Compco.
9 As in Stiffel, no review was. sought on this determination in the Supreme
Court.
10 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F. 2d 26 (7th Cir. 1963).
"IThis clause empowers Congress "to promote the progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
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a patent on an article which lacked the level of invention re-
quired for federal patents. To do either would run counter to
the policy of Congress of granting patents only to true inven-
tions, and then only for a limited time. Just as a State cannot
encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, it cannot, under
some other law, such as that forbidding unfair competition, give
protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the
federal patent laws. z (Footnotes omitted.)
In applying this doctrine of preemption of the field through federal
legislation, the Court further emphasized the discord and its practical
ramifications:
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to
prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight an
advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block off
from the public something which federal law has said belongs
to the public. The result would be that while federal law grants
only 14 or 17 years' protection to genuine inventions 13 States
could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty
to merit any patent at all under federal constitutional standards.
This would be too great an encroachment on the federal patent
system to be tolerated.' 4
The Court stressed that the states, under appropriate circumstances,
could require labeling or other precautionary means to be utilized to
prevent confusion as to the source of similar goods. The Court ex-
pressly stated that due to the federal patent laws, unpatented and un-
copyrighted atricles could be copied at will and that the states could not
prohibit or award damages for such copying alone.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Compco,'5 urged
that the states should have more leeway in the situations where the
defendant has attempted to palm off his goods as those of another and
that the copying itself should be allowed to be prohibited in those cases
where the dominant purpose of the defendant is shown to be the preda-
tory business practice of palming off.
The rubric of unfair competition is peculiarly American in its
origin and scope. While the term is not normally used by the English
courts, they have applied its principles under the heading of "passing
off." In its outset, the doctrine of unfair competition in the United
States was based on the tort principle that prohibits one from diverting
the business of another by the fraudulent misrepresentation that his
articles or goods are those of the other.1 6 This necessarily involved the
requirement of a "palming off" or "passing off" by the tortfeasor. Such
1376 U.S. at 230-31.
13 See 35 U.S.C. §§154, 173 (1958).
14Id., at 231-32.
15 376 U.S. at 239.
16 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §760 (1939). See also OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRAC-
TICEs 44 (1950); POLLACK, TORTS 248 (14th ed. 1939).
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was the holding of the early cases within this field.' 7 This concept of
unfair competition has been extended to the imitation of labels, pack-
ages, color, dress, design, form, and appearance of articles. Generally,
the courts have accepted imitation as inherent in the competitive pro-
cess and have sanctioned the copying in the absence of passing off
or other fraudulent practices.'
In 1918, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision
in the landmark case of International News Serv. v. Associated Press."0
A new theory thus became injected into the field of unfair competition
which was subsequently to become known as the misappropriation
theory.
In Associated Press, the Court was concerned with the practice of
the International News Service of copying news releases of Associated
Press placed upon bulletin boards and published in first editions of
Associated Press member newspapers. These releases were transmitted
to the member newspapers of International News Service. As a result
of this practice, western newspapers serviced by International News
published these releases before or simultaneously with publication by
western papers serviced by Associated.
In speaking generally of the nature of the action for unfair competi-
tion, Mr. Justice Pitney, who rendered the majority decision, stated that
"obviously, the question of what is unfair competition must be deter-
mined with particular reference to the character and circumstances of
the business." 20
The defendant argued that due to the publication of the news by
the plaintiff, the news releases became the common possession of all.
In rejecting this contention, Mr. Justice Pitney declared that "the fault
in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the complainant
as against the public, instead of considering the rights of the complain-
ant and defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves."'2'
The defendant also urged that there could be no finding or unfair
competition absent a showing of palming off. The Court answered this
contention when it stated:
It is said that the elements of unfair competition are lacking
because there is no attempt by defendant to palm off its goods
as those of the complainant, characteristic of the most familiar,
17Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Howe Scale Co. v.
Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118 (1905); Goodyear Co. v. Good-
year Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888).
18 For extended discussions on the historical development of the law of unfair
competition, see Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1940);
Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IoWA L. REv. 175 (1936).
19 248 U.S. 215 (1918), noted in 4 CORNELL L. Q. 223 (1919), 13 ILL. L. REv. 708
(1919), 17 MicH. L. REv. 490 (1919), 67 U. PA. L. REV. 191 (1919), and 28
YALE L. J. 387 (1919).
20 248 U.S. at 236.
21Id. at 239.
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if not the most typical, cases of unfair competition. . . . But we
cannot concede that the right to equitable relief is confined to
that class of cases. In the present case the fraud upon complain-
ant's rights is more direct and obvious. Regarding news matter
as the mere material from which these two competing parties are
endeavoring to make money, and treating it, therefore, as quasi
property for the purposes of their business because they are
selling it as such, defendant's conduct differs from the ordinary
case of unfair competition in trade principally in this that, in-
stead of selling its own goods as those of complainant, it sub-
stitutes misappropriation in the place of misrepresentation, and
sells complainant's goods as its own.22
The Court, in concluding that as between themselves there was a
property interest in the news, held that the appropriation of it amounted
to unconscionable conduct resulting in unfair competition on the part
of International News and that International News was attempting to
reap where it had not sown.
The misappropriation theory, sometimes referred to as the "free
ride" doctrine,2 3 provided an elastic principle for application in unfair
competition cases. The general language of the Court could be inter-
preted as a means of providing protection to various products of one's
labor, though unprotected by patent or copyright. It remained to be
seen whether the maxim "he who reaps where he has not sown" rec-
ognized another cause of action in the product simulation field equally
valid as that which is based on the doctrine of passing off.
In the first significant decision to arise after the Associated Press
case, the misappropriation theory was dealt a serious blow. In Cheyney
Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.2 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was asked to enjoin the copying of plaintiff's fashion
designs, commonly known as "design piracy." The plaintiff based his
claim for relief upon the Associated Press decision, claiming a quasi
property right in his designs, which were the result of his hard work
and effort. Judge Learned Hand, obviously influenced by Mr. Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Associated Press, refused to grant such relief.
Almost mirroring the ultimate reflections of the Supreme Court in the
Stiffel and Compco cases, Judge Hand stated:
Of the cases on which the plaintiff relies, the chief is Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press. . . . Although that
concerned another subject matter-printed news dispatches-
we agree that, if it meant to lay down a general doctrine, it
would cover this case; at least, the language of the majority
opinion goes so far. We do not believe that it did. While it is of
course true that law ordinarily speaks in general terms, there are
22 Id. at 241-42.
23Alexander v. Irving Trust Co., 132 F. Supp. 364, 368 (S.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 228
F. 2d 221 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996 (1956).
24 35 F. 2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
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cases where the occasion is at once the justification for, and the
limit of, what is decided. This appears to us such an instance;
we think that no more was covered than situations substantially
similar to those then at bar. The difficulties of understanding it
otherwise are insuperable. We are to suppose that the court
meant to create a sort of common law patent or copyright for
reasons of justice. Either would flagrantly conflict with the
scheme which Congress has for more than a century devised to
cover the subject-matter.2 5
In later decisions, Judge Hand continued to deny the applicability
of the doctrine to situations other than that of news items.26
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,2 7 reaffirmed the principle of the Associated Press case when he
declared:
'Unfair competition,' as known to the common law, is a lim-
ited concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the palming off
of one's goods as those of a rival trader .... In recent years, its
scope has been extended. It has been held to apply to misap-
propriation as well as misrepresentation, to the selling of an-
other's goods as one's own,-to misappropriation of what equit-
ably belongs to a competitor.28
Despite this reaffirmation, a subsequent Supreme Court case cast
considerable doubt upon the expansion of the "free ride" doctrine. In
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,29 the Court was concerned with
the infringement of a claimed trade name. The Court held that the term
"Shredded Wheat" was generic and that the plaintiff had not shown
that the term in the minds of the consuming public was connected with
the producer and not the product. This reasoning is consistent with the
traditional theory requiring a palming off. In meeting the plaintiff's
contention that the defendant was sharing in the good will of a product
created by its expense, time, and effort the Court said:
To share fully in the goodwill, it must use the name and the
pillow-shape. And in the goodwill Kellogg Company is as free
to share as the plaintiff....
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of
the article known as 'Shredded Wheat,' and thus is sharing in
a market which was created by the skill and judgment of plain-
tiff's predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expendi-
tures in advertising persistently made. But that is not unfair.
Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or
trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in
25 Id. at 280.
26 R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. 'Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940) ; National Comics
Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F. 2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951) ; G. Ricordi
& Co. v. I-aendler, 194 F. 2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
27295 U.S. 495 (1935).
28 Id. at 531.
-9 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
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the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply inter-
ested. There is no evidence of passing off or deception on the
part of the Kellogg Company; and it has taken every reasonable
precaution to prevent confusion or the practice of deception in
the sale of its product.30 (Footnote omitted.)
In the course of its decision, the Court did not cite the Associated
Press case, nor consider the question of the rights of the parties between
themselves as opposed to the public, nor did it enter into any discussion
as to whether Nabisco had gained any quasi property rights in the
product.
Those courts which have specifically rejected the misappropriation
theory have done so due to their fear of creating a new species of
property interests and a new series of monopolies. This fear has over-
ridden any emotive reaction to the reprehensible conduct of one reaping
the fruits of another's labor. The preservation of free competition has
been foremost in their mind and, as before stated, they have accepted
imitation as inherent in the competitive process.-1 Those courts which
specifically negated the application of the misappropriation theory only
to news and similar cases, have done so on the basis that the doctrine
is consonant with the value of the preservation of free competition and
that in its application it serves to further this value rather than mitigate
against it.32
Due to the narrow interpretation generally placed upon the Associ-
ated Press case, there have been very few decisions for plaintiffs in cases
other than those concerning news, except where factors other than
mere "appropriation" were involved. Relief has been largely confined
to cases involving news dispatches, broadcasting, artistic perform-
ances, and related activities. 3
Some infusion of the misappropriation theory can be detected in
cases which have ostensibly been decided under the traditional theory
of unfair competition.3 4
One such case is American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber35 in which
the court was confronted with the copying of the plaintiff's collar
pressing machines by the defendant and its marketing of these machines
30 Id. at 121-22.
31 Handler, supra note 18.
32 See Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 VAND.
L. REv. 483 (1957).
33Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Wash. 1934); Pitts-
burgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938);
Waring v. WDS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937)
Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.
2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
3 Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 Fed. 939 (2d Cir.
1908) ; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 Fed. 37 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Flint
v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg., 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. N.Y. 1955) ; Mastercrafters
Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221
F. 2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955).
35269 F. 2d 255 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959).
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through an advertising plan patterned after that of the plaintiff. It is
interesting to note that all machines marketed by the defendant were
marked with the defendant's name plate. Though the majority of the
court held the simulation of the plaintiff's product privileged per se,
they held the defendant's conduct actionable due to its connection with
fraudulent marketing practices.
Although we have not concluded that at the production level
the mere simulation of plaintiff's machine was actionable under
the conditions of our competitive economy, the high degree of
similarity between the litigants' machines is still a material factor
in evaluating the second part of Amco's claim of unfair competi-
tion, that dealing with defendants' alleged fraudulent marketing.
, * * For Schreiber & Goldberg, even though the possibilities of
confusion as to source attributable to its copying Amco's machine
were to be tolerated, are certainly under a duty not to aggravate
the potentialities for confusion by questionable marketing tech-
niques.36
The court continued by stating:
It is not necessary that the source be the primary motivation
for purchase. In fact, we are content on this point to accept the
forecast of Schreiber & Goldberg that the confusion as to source
would be as important as they intended it to be. . . .Nor are
we, in view of the deliberate plan to poach unjustifiably on
Amco's goodwill, disposed to debate in detail the probabilities of
confusion.3 7
The majority specifically did not find that the defendant had
"palmed off" its goods as those of the plaintiff's, an essential require-
ment under the traditional theory. Mere copying connected with alleged
fraudulent marketing amounted to unfair competition. The marketing
would normally only be found fraudulent if it was used to confuse the
public as to the source of the goods, a finding which the court did not
make.
Judge Clark, in a vigorous dissent, noted the revolutionary character
of the decision. Decrying the lack of specific findings by the majority
on the essential elements of unfair competition and the use of such
emotive words as "poach," "deceitful," "fraudulent," and "cunningly
contrived pirating," Judge Clark clearly pointed out the essence of the
court's decision: "'Fraudulent marketing,' as the court here defines it
-or rather declined to find it-seems to amount to no more and no
less than the defendants' unquestionably privileged copying of plain-
tiff's machine."3' 8
At least two states, in applying their unfair competition laws, have
approved of the rationale of the Associated Press case in product simu-
36.d at 275.
37M. at 276.381d. at 280.
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lation cases. Perhaps this trend, viewed as alarming by those supporting
the traditional theory, led to the Supreme Court's action in Stiffel and
Compco.
In Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries9 the district court, in
applying the California law, issued an injunction against the defendant,
prohibiting him from copying the ash tray produced by the plaintiff.
Though emphasizing that confusion of the public is the gist of unfair
competition and impliedly finding that the public was misled as to the
source of the defendant's ashtray, though the defendant's name ap-
peared on the bottom of its copy, the court stated:
Copying of the product of another, as defendant is doing
here, in precise detail as to design, shape and color, and in every
other respect than quality, is nothing less than piracy. And where
as here myriad variations are available to the misappropriator,
his very act of copying strongly impels the inference that he
intends to reap commercial gain by trading on the goodwill of
the first comer....
Our moral standards are well sustained and the public in-
terest in free competition is advanced where a court of equity
forbids the immoral act of misappropriation by exact copying
of the goods or services of another [citing Associated Press].40
In Dior v. Milton41 the Supreme Court of New York was faced with
the recurring problem of design piracy.42 In holding for the plaintiff,
the court might have rested its decision on breach of contract or fraud.
Or, since it apparently decided that no publication had taken place, it
might have based its decision on common law copyright. Instead the
court leaned heavily upon the decision in the Associated Press case, took
pains to show that unfair competition has been extended beyond cases
of "palming off," and spoke extensively of misappropriation. The court
declared:
To hold that the protection of plaintiff's property is lost at
just the point at which the property becomes valuable and needs
protection would be tantamount to holding that the property
rights are not entitled to protection at all....
There is no reason apparent to this court why the rights of
the plaintiffs should receive less protection than those of the
sponsor of sporting events and the disseminator of news. 43
39 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
-10 Id. at 270-71. It is interesting to note that in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit
Co., supra note 29, the Supreme Court held trading on the goodwill of the
first comer a necessary concomitant of free competition, absent a "palming
off."
419 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S. 2d 443 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 2 App. Div. 2d
878, 156 N.Y.S. 2d 996 (1956).
42 See Callman, Style and Design Piracy, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 557 (1940);
Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L. J. 235 (1944).
43 Dior v. Milton, supra note 41, at 458, 460.
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Stiffel and Compco now have made it clear that the misappropri-
ation theory as applied to cases involving article duplication is to be
rejected. Thus ends a battle of interpretation which has raged since the
rendering of the Associated Press decision over forty years ago. The
decisions can be explained as being consistent with traditional notions
of protection against "passing off," while impliedly rejecting the free
ride or misappropriation doctrine. By applying the doctrine of pre-
emption of the field by congressional enactment of federal patent and
copyright laws, the Supreme Court has brought uniformity to this area
of state law and rung the death knell for the misappropriation theory
as applied to product simulation.
WYLIE A. AITKEN
